| October 13, 2005: As
I look at the issues that cannot be avoided as we prepare to lay the
groundwork for a discussion of the shape of the 2007 Farm Bill, several
things come to mind. The first is the federal deficit and the second
is the pressure that is being put on WTO negotiators to eliminate
agricultural subsidies. These two factors have the potential to significantly
affect the nature of the 2007 Farm Bill discussion.
While these two issues may seem to be unrelated, one domestic and
the other international, they in fact stem from a common cause.
If crop prices in the 1997-2004 period were at the same level that
they were in early 1996, we wouldn’t be talking about either
one. However, because of low market prices for the eight major US
crops, spending on the farm program zoomed to over $20 billion a
year and recently has settled back into the mid-teens. Much of the
time over the last nine years, crop prices have been well below
the cost of production. When these crops are sold into export markets
at low prices, farmers and governments around the world accuse us
of dumping our excess production on international markets at a price
that is below the full cost of production. As a result we have seen
a growing chorus of those who, as a part of WTO negotiations, are
calling for the elimination of all subsidies in the US and other
developed countries.
The issue that has to be addressed, then, is the part that recent
US farm policy may have played in bringing about these low prices.
I would argue that the low prices are the consequence of basing
farm policy on an incorrect set of assumptions about the nature
of the agricultural sector, particularly crop agriculture. Going
into the 1996 Farm Bill, it was assumed that (1) the agricultural
sector behaves more like other economic sectors than it did when
farm programs were first adopted in the 1930s; (2) exports are the
key to a prosperous US agricultural sector, after all 95 percent
of the consumers of food live outside the US; and (3) government
farm programs are the problem, not the solution, and if the government
would get out of the way and allow markets to work, US agriculture
would be on the road to a market-driven prosperity. Let us look
at these one at a time.
In other economic sectors, low prices stimulate two responses—consumers
increase their purchases while manufacturers reduce production quickly
returning the industry to profitability. Low food prices, however,
do not stimulate consumers to increase their food intake from three
meals to five meals a day. Similarly, it is not in the best interest
of individual crop farmers to measurably reduce their acreage or
use of inputs in the face of lower prices. Any income they receive
above the variable cost of production can be put toward the fixed
costs.
US farmers have enjoyed an export driven prosperity three times
in the last century—WWI, WWII, and the mid-to-late 1970s—and
none of them were triggered by US farm policy instruments. These
periods of surging exports lasted a total of no more than 14 years
out of the last hundred. Most countries view their domestic food
production in the same way that US residents view the military,
it is a matter of national security. Most nations that have an adequate
amount of arable land would prefer to grow their own food rather
than become dependent on imports. The level of US exports of crops
like corn are more a function of production variations in other
nations than it is a function of price.
Under government farm programs in effect prior to the adoption
of the 1996 Farm Bill, the non-recourse loan rate set an effective
floor on program crop prices by taking production out of the commercial
market and placing it into government storage. With the extension
of Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) to crops like corn, soybeans,
and wheat, prices could fall below the loan rate, farmers could
collect the difference between the posted county price and the loan
rate while still retaining possession of the crop that could then
be sold at prices well below the cost of production. A comparison
of corn prices before and after the implementation of the FAIR Act
shows that for the same year-ending stocks-to-use ratio, prices
in the post 1996 period were 34 cents a bushel lower than they were
when government policy put a floor on corn prices. Before the adoption
of the FAIR Act, government policy worked in a manner so as to ensure
that farmers received the bulk of their income from the marketplace
and at the same time maintained lower government costs. With a floor
on crop prices, other nations had little reason to accuse the US
of dumping.
If a variation of the pre-1996 farm programs were in effect today,
crop prices would be higher, government farm program costs would
be significantly lower, farmers would receive more of their income
from the marketplace, the volume of our crop exports would be virtually
the same as it is today, the value of our crop exports would be
higher, and farmers around the world would be receiving higher prices
for their crops making the accusations of dumping moot.
For all of their weaknesses, farm policies in effect prior to 1996
had fewer negative side effects than the policies in effect today.
We would contend that the reason for this is that the earlier policies
took into account the unique economic characteristics of crop agriculture
and were designed to work both in periods of stable to declining
exports and increasing exports.
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